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The metapsychology of depression
Cyril Couve
In this review of some key psychoanalytic ideas about depression, I shall be using Henri Rey’s (1994b) notion of a depressive psychic organization that constitutes a kind of fabric of the experience 
that we call depression. This depressive psychic organization has two 
interrelated elements. First, it emerges in relation to the loss of an 
object. The term “object” here refers to a person, a loved one, a loved 
attachment, a relationship, or a country or also to what can be called 
a self-object, such as an ideal, a standard, or an expectation about 
oneself (Freud, 1917e [1915]). The second element refers to a sense of 
personal responsibility, conscious or unconscious, about the loss itself. 
Without the presence  of this psychic organization it is difﬁcult to make 
the diagnosis of depression. This should not be taken to mean that 
causes that do not fall within the psychic domain—such as biological 
causes of depression—are excluded. It is perfectly possible to hold a 
psychoanalytic view of depression and include other causes. Rather, it 
should be taken to mean that without such a mental structure it would 
be difﬁcult to make the diagnosis of depression.
Another point needs emphasis. The connection between loss, 
separation, and depression is quite accepted today, both within and 
outside psychoanalytic writings on the subject. However, the con-
nection between loss and depression is not an automatic one. What 
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determines whether depression follows a loss or a series of losses 
depends on what the child or the adult has made of the loss and 
how he or she has reacted to it. Depression is one way of reacting to 
loss. From within the psychoanalytic tradition, depression is not seen 
as a result of loss but, more speciﬁcally, as a result of an inability to deal 
with loss or as a result of an inability to do the work of mourning. Here, 
an important distinction emerges between mourning and depression. 
The capacity to mourn and to grieve is a kind of psychic insurance 
against depression. Depression is not an automatic consequence of 
loss. Depressive feelings are usually present in mourning, but they 
are transient and not ﬁxed.
Freud’s 1917 paper “Mourning and Melancholia” is the foundation 
for the psychoanalytic understanding and formulation of loss and de-
pression. It is a complex paper, which moves on different levels. Freud 
compared the state of mourning to that of melancholia in order to 
understand melancholia, by which he meant psychotic depression or 
manic-depressive psychosis. The state of mind that we call mourning 
has various features in common with the melancholic state of mind, 
according to Freud. In both mourning and melancholia there is an ex-
tremely painful dejection, a loss of interest in the outside world, a loss 
of the capacity to turn to new relationships, and a turning away from 
activity not connected with the lost one. However, Freud was keen to 
single out major differences between these two states.
In a state of mourning, the mourner is preoccupied, almost exclu-
sively, with the psychic work of thinking about and remembering the 
lost object. According to Freud the world feels impoverished because 
the object is no more. By contrast, the loss that has led to the patho-
logical reaction of melancholia is much more difﬁcult to detect. This 
is due to the disproportion between the nature of the melancholic 
reaction, which can be quite catastrophic, and the loss itself. Whereas 
the mourner feels that the world is impoverished without his or her 
love object, the melancholic is far more preoccupied with the impov-
erishment of his or her own ego. This impoverishment takes the form 
of an intense, relentless, and merciless self-castigation and self-hatred, 
which can achieve delusional proportions. Freud singled out the delu-
sion of self-belittlement as being the crucial distinguishing feature be-
tween the state of mourning and that of melancholia. He also pointed 
out that the melancholic does not hide his self-hatred but, instead, 
proclaims that he is a sinner, a criminal, that he is rotten, and so forth 
in a rather exhibitionistic way. So there is a deﬁnite narcissistic and 
37THE METAPSYCHOLOGY OF DEPRESSION
exhibitionistic element to the melancholic’s relentless self-depreciation 
and masochism. In addition, although the dejection of the mourning 
process is extremely painful, the mourner eventually comes to know 
that this is a normal reaction that will pass away with time, once the 
work of mourning has been done. Freud called it the “work of mourn-
ing” in order to stress the psychic work and mental effort and energy 
that goes into the process of mourning.
Freud’s conceptual strategy in his paper is very interesting. He 
puts forward a hypothesis that in the case of melancholia there has 
been a loss, but the loss is an unconscious one. The way he comes to 
this hypothesis is very ingenious. He says that if one listens to all the 
self-accusations and the intense criticisms of the melancholic, they 
do not seem to apply to the person of the melancholic but could very 
well be directed to a signiﬁcant ﬁgure in the life of the melancholic. 
This intense self-hatred, Freud thought, linked once to a hatred of an 
object outside the self. The crises and anxieties generated by this very 
intense ambivalence are such that the hated object is taken into the self 
through a process called “introjection”. Through the process of intro-
jection, instead of hating the object the melancholic hates him/herself, 
now identiﬁed with the object. Freud, drawing inspiration from the 
writings of his colleague Karl Abraham (1924), describes this mode of 
relating to an object as a very primitive one, whose prototype involved 
an oral incorporation of an object in fantasy.
Freud’s paper is a foundation paper, a pioneering paper, but also 
one that is full of gaps and uncertainties. Nevertheless, it contains many 
implicit and explicit truths that are very important. First, it establishes 
a clear link between the state of depression and the internalization of 
an object or ﬁgure that is relentless, punishing, and merciless. In other 
words, it establishes a very important relation between depression and 
the sense of responsibility or guilt, which can take extreme forms such 
as persecutory guilt in cases like melancholia and severe depressive 
states. Second, it is also implicit in Freud’s paper that the introjection 
of the hated and hateful object inside the self means that the object has 
not been let go and remains within the self, with terrible consequences. 
In contemporary psychoanalytic theory these primitive introjective 
identiﬁcations, with their omnipotent character, would be understood 
as functioning as a defence against separateness and loss. Third, what 
is also interesting about “Mourning and Melancholia” is that although 
Freud uses the parallel with melancholia to understand melancholic 
despair, he ends up with a dynamic view of severe depression and 
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still very little insight into what constitutes what he calls the work of 
mourning. Freud quite candidly pointed out that the reason why the 
work of mourning should be so difﬁcult actually eluded him.
He understood the work of mourning as a conﬂict between a part 
of the self that, through memory and through a revisiting of memories 
about the object, kept the object alive and a part of the self that had 
the capacity to submit every one of these memories to the judgement 
of reality. Reality says the object is no more; it is dead or is lost. Freud 
conceived of the work of mourning as a process of maintaining attach-
ments to the object through memory while at the same time detaching 
oneself from the object by a process of reality testing. After a while, the 
reality ego prevails over the pleasure ego. While this is interesting, it 
leaves us, in the main, with an economic view of mourning regarding 
quantities of attachment and abilities to detach, but not with a fully 
ﬂeshed-out psychodynamic view of the process of mourning.
The depressive position
This is where the work of the psychoanalyst Melanie Klein on the 
depressive position is of great interest and value. Klein’s theory of the 
depressive position allowed her to provide a structural explanation 
for states of mind present in severe psychotic/melancholic depres-
sion, but also for the state of mind associated with normal mourning. 
According to Klein, the situation of loss and mourning revived the 
conﬂict of the depressive position and is an occasion to continue the 
working-through of such conﬂicts. The state of mourning, according 
to Klein, is a transient “depression”, with a crucial difference: in suc-
cessful mourning, it is possible to bear guilt, it is possible to engage in repa-
ration proper, and it is possible to re-establish a good relation with the loved 
object and good internal object. Although Klein established a rapproche-
ment between the work of mourning and the state of depression, she 
also maintained a very important distinction between the capacity to 
mourn and the incapacity to mourn, which led to depression. While 
Freud hinted in the direction of this distinction, I suggest that he was 
unable to give us a dynamic explanation for it.
Melanie Klein referred to the depressive position as a major struc-
ture in infantile life inaugurating a new mode of relating to objects, a 
new psychic reality, a new experience of the world, and the emergence 
of what she called depressive anxiety—a new form of very primitive 
anxiety, with its own group of defences. A mixture of internal and 
external factors allows the very young infant to negotiate some of 
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the conﬂicts of the earlier paranoid–schizoid position, which Klein 
thought occurred during the ﬁrst few months of life. According to 
Klein, the paranoid–schizoid way of relating to the object means a 
relation to part-objects. The splitting mechanisms are such that the 
object that gratiﬁes—the “good” object or the idealized object—is kept 
wholly separate from the object that frustrates. The frustrating object is 
hated and, by projection, becomes hateful and persecutory: the “bad” 
object. The crux of the paranoid–schizoid mode of relating is that ide-
alized and persecutory objects are kept wholly separate, so that both 
the object and the ego are split. This results in a part-object mode of 
relating, and in such a world there is no place for loss. The anxiety that 
dominates is that of being persecuted by the bad object and contains 
fears of psychic dissolution, of disintegration into bits in relation to 
bad objects. The omnipotent possession of the idealized object is a 
desperate defence against this awful state of persecution.
If the infant has been properly contained and mothered and has in-
ternalized a sustaining object, then there is movement to whole-object 
relating. This means that the loved object is also the object who is hated 
and attacked. When development goes well, there is an increased 
capacity on the part of the infant to bear frustration (e.g., when the 
mother is absent), depending on whether a sustaining object has been 
introjected. This enables an increased capacity within the infant to feel 
separated from his or her objects such that there is more of a distinc-
tion between him/herself and others. In this entry into the depressive 
position, emotional ambivalence is experienced towards the object, 
together with an enhanced capacity to integrate feelings of love and of 
hatred stemming from the same self, initiating emotional whole-object 
relating. This inaugurates a new psychic reality: the anxiety of loss of 
the object that is loved.
It is important to point out that, for Klein, entry into the depressive 
position is not dyadic in nature: it is triadic. With an increased aware-
ness about the mother as a separate person, the new object world that 
is entered into involves the mother’s relationship with a third object. 
The object who is hated and attacked is not simply the mother but, 
rather, the mother’s link with others. In her work with young children, 
Klein showed with great clarity the concrete nature of the child’s fan-
tasy. Here, the fantasies about triangularity and the triangular psychic 
space have as their new object the mother’s body and what is inside 
the mother’s body. In terms of the contents of mother’s body, this 
can include milk, other babies, and also some link with father, a very 
primitive type of father, which Klein calls the father’s penis.
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Since it is the link to objects that is attacked, it also means that the 
anxiety is very great, because it is all the objects that are attacked. The 
depressive position is particularly poignant emotionally because it is 
triangular, which also means that it is not only one object that is at-
tacked or split, but it is all the objects that are damaged in phantasy. 
Hence, she refers to the notion that in the depressive position the 
object world is in chaos. She pointed out that while the anxiety is of a 
more persecutory or paranoid nature (i.e. there is a fear that the objects 
that have been attacked will retaliate, hence leading to a considerable 
amount of persecutory anxiety), it is also depressive in nature in that 
it inaugurates a fear of loss, a concern for the object who has been lost 
or damaged or whose loss is feared, and guilt because it is the same 
loved object or objects that are also hated and attacked in fantasy. So, 
in the depressive position, the child or the adult in later life has to 
confront both paranoid anxiety and depressive anxiety. The coexist-
ence of paranoid anxiety and depressive anxiety leads to a structure 
in which guilt can easily become tinged by a very persecutory quality. 
If paranoid anxiety is still dominant, then guilt will tend to achieve a 
more persecutory character. The major defence against this new form 
of anxiety is what Klein calls the group of manic defences. While there 
are other defences in the depressive position, such as the important 
obsessional defences, I shall focus on some essential aspect of the 
manic defences.
Characteristics of the manic defence
1. There is omnipotent denial of need and dependency. Since need 
and dependency occasion an exposure to the pain of being sepa-
rate and also to the pain of exclusion in the new triangular rela-
tions, this can lead to a very conﬂictual relationship to the world 
of objects. Need and dependency are omnipotently denied and 
omnipotently triumphed over.
2. The triumph over need and dependency is also achieved by a 
triumph over the object. The importance of the object is devalued, 
belittled, and demoted, as a way of avoiding what Klein calls “the 
perils of dependency”.
3. It is not sufﬁciently understood that the triumph over need and 
over one’s object is absolutely central to what Klein calls omnipo-
tent or concrete reparation. One way of attempting to restore the 
damaged object is to omnipotently rid oneself of one’s needs for 
objects and one’s dependency on objects that occasioned conﬂict 
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and destructive attacks in the ﬁrst place. Fantasies of manic re-
pair are often expressed in terms of omnipotent and narcissistic 
fantasies of self-sufﬁciency, whereby the need for the object and 
the importance of the object is demoted or radically denied be-
cause one has all the resources oneself. By being perfect, big, and 
omnipotently grown up and resourceful, the self avoids the risk 
of ambivalence and destructive conﬂict, which lead to depressive 
anxiety and depressive despair.
4. Under the pressure of the manic defence, a splitting of the object 
and of the self between alive and dead takes place. The damaged 
object is dreaded and, instead, the alive part of the self and of the 
object are idealized. Manic states are usually characterized by 
grandiosity and overactivity and a forceful but brittle liveliness; 
they can also be highly sexualized states to ensure the triumph of 
aliveness over the dread of deadness.
5. The problem with manic defences, which are essentially trium-
phant and defeating, is that they themselves constitute attacks on 
the object and on the self, which leads to more guilt and to more 
persecution. In working with a person in a manic state, the change 
from a feeling of being completely devalued to one in which one 
is intensely concerned for the brittleness of a patient can be quite 
startling. Mania protects the patient against the feared experience 
of depressive despair, of psychic pain, and of persecutory internal 
ﬁgures.
The psychic task of the depressive position is gradually to be able 
to bear guilt and to engage in what Klein referred to as “reparation 
proper”. Reparation proper means that one cannot put absolutely right 
the damage one has caused to the object in phantasy. But excessive 
guilt and despair give way to the emergence of concern, of love, or of 
pining for the objects lost. In other words, reparation proper allows the 
self to reinstate a good and loving internal relationship with the lost 
object. This can only come about when depressive guilt can be faced 
and not ﬂed from with omnipotent defences, denials, and mechanisms. 
For Klein, reactions to loss will depend greatly on the way the conﬂicts 
of the depressive position have been worked through and negotiated. 
If loss mobilizes persecution and despair, then melancholic states or 
severely depressive states will most probably result.
The work of mourning is difﬁcult because the loss re-evokes the 
conﬂicts of the depressive position—that is, the loss of a loved one 
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re-evokes the guilt occasioned by one’s own death wishes and attacks 
on one’s early objects vital for psychic survival and development. If 
these conﬂicts are still virulent, then mourning cannot take place and 
a pathological reaction to loss is likely. If the conﬂicts are less intense 
and more attenuated, then the loss of a good internal object is only 
temporary, transient, and the trust in the individual’s capacity for 
concern and capacity to face guilt, along with a capacity for reparation 
proper, leads to the reinstatement of good and loving feelings towards 
one’s own internal objects. This, according to Klein, is the crux of the 
work of mourning: to be able to restore a loving relationship with one’s 
internal good objects.
Clinical illustration:  
Twenty-session psychotherapy with Mr D
The difﬁculties experienced in the work of mourning can be seen in 
the following psychotherapy treatment with Mr D, a patient whom 
I saw for twenty sessions, who was unable to fully mourn a tragic 
loss. D was in his early sixties and had been prescribed a variety 
of antidepressants over the previous ﬁve years. He had become 
dependent on them, even though they didn’t help his depression. 
As a builder, he moved around and managed to obtain medication 
from a variety of GPs until he met a psychologically minded GP 
who fortunately felt he needed psychotherapy and not just medi-
cation.
The narrative I am going to give is a result of the twenty sessions 
and was not obtained in one go. D’s attendance and punctuality 
were very erratic, especially at the beginning. Whenever he started 
to tell me about the loss, he would sob very painfully, which often 
meant he could not carry on telling me what he had started. As a 
result sessions were very disjointed, especially at the beginning. D 
told me that he had lost his wife seven years ago in the most tragic 
of circumstances. They had been married for over twenty years, 
a very close couple, both  Catholics, and had three children, now 
in their twenties and late teens. As Catholics they used natural 
contraception: abstention, or coitus interruptus during ovulation. 
His wife had become anxious because of a lump in her breast. She 
consulted two different GPs and was reassured that the lump was 
benign and did not need to be removed. His wife went along with 
the diagnosis but was not entirely reassured by it. One night they 
made love, unprotected, and then he ejaculated inside her. It was 
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a mistake. His wife told him jokingly at that moment: “now this is 
it, you have killed me.” Things then happened very fast. She fell 
pregnant, the tumour was malignant, and, with the pregnancy, 
the cancer spread and she developed a secondary. Tragically the 
pregnancy bought life and death at the same time. I think that the 
juxtaposition of these two extremely contradictory and antithetical 
events of life on the one hand and death at the same time most 
probably complicated the process of mourning considerably.
Mrs D was placed in an intensive care unit for much of the preg-
nancy. In a desperate attempt to save the mother, they had dis-
cussed abortion, if this might help. But it was too late. And anyway, 
even if this could have helped, their Catholic principles would 
have made them decide against it. My patient saw his wife die 
gradually. However, some of the memories of them together in the 
hospital bedroom were recounted with an extraordinary vividness 
and presence and with an unbearable sadness that made me feel 
close to tears. Their son was eventually born a healthy baby, and 
before her death two weeks later his wife had asked him: “Promise 
me you will look after our baby as I would.” He had promised.
D received no bereavement counselling but was told by a consult-
ant who had worked on the case that he should not think of mak-
ing any new or major move in his life for at least nine months, for 
his own and also for the baby’s sake. Interestingly, he followed this 
advice to the absolute letter. I felt, as therapy developed, that he 
had heard it and had reacted to it as if it were a kind of edict or an 
injunction. He gave himself exactly nine months, not a day more, 
not a day less, and then moved his entire family to a region just 
north of London. Building work was abundant there, so he could 
make good money and give everything he had promised he would 
to his children and the baby.
He worked hard during the day, and also at night, when he would 
look after his infant son. During the day, childminders were used 
to help. Despite the hardship in his life, he felt that he was do-
ing pretty well and that he was overcoming the loss of his wife. 
However, when he could make better use of his sessions, he also 
presented the other side of him that did not cope so well. He de-
scribed states of utter exhaustion, culminating in moments of total 
impatience with his crying young baby at night, sometimes shak-
ing him angrily to try to get some sleep, expressing considerable 
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guilt in depending so extensively on his elder daughter to help care 
for his little son.
After one year of being in London, he met a woman, herself a 
relatively young widow with two children. They became friends, 
and lovers, and soon decided it would be better to live under the 
same roof with their combined families. It was from this point 
on that he started to feel badly depressed, constantly tormented 
by thoughts telling him that he should commit suicide. The very 
fact that such thoughts came to him increased his sense of guilt 
because of his Catholic morality. He did not get these thoughts 
when at work. Usually they came at night when he could not sleep 
or on his way to or from work. As he downed his tools, he would 
be invaded with guilt and fear about what he may do while driv-
ing back home. These depressive moods and thoughts descended 
on him, and he felt that he would be condemned to live this kind 
of misery for ever. He would think about his wife and her death 
and would sob uncontrollably but without much relief. When he 
was prescribed antidepressants, he soon became addicted to them. 
When I saw him, he was taking the pills at will to try to stop his 
depressive and suicidal thoughts. As soon as he would have them 
he would take an antidepressant. Antidepressants helped him a bit 
initially, but after ﬁve years he was still depressed and afraid now 
that he had become addicted to medication. By the time I saw him 
he also mentioned that his sexual relation with his new partner had 
become virtually non-existent, and this worried him a great deal 
in case she thought he was just with her to replace his dead wife. 
(This narrative makes it sound simple and self-evident, but it was 
not. Information came in very disjointed bits.)
When we started treatment my patient was very sceptical about 
how talking to me could help him. He felt that he had remembered 
all the details of his wife’s death so often, and had gone through 
them so often, that it was not as if there was anything he was hid-
ing to himself. So how could talking to me help him? Whereupon 
in the session he would tell me something about his wife and then 
start to weep and to sob uncontrollably. The pain and sadness were 
so intense that he could not carry on telling me what he had started 
to talk about. When the session would end, he often was in a heap 
and would leave in a state of despair. I was left feeling terrible, 
caught up with the devastating pathos of his tragic loss, but also 
with a sense of impotence and anxiety about how he would cope 
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with such sadness over the next week. I was never seriously wor-
ried that he would commit suicide. But he evoked in me great con-
cern about his state over the following week until his next session. 
After a while, by using and listening to my countertransference, 
I started to understand how this man could get antidepressant 
medication from his GPs, because he very subtly evoked in one 
a combination of intense sympathy and caring and also a kind of 
helplessness and anxiety at the same time. This helped me start 
to think about the distinction between what was pathos in this 
man—and there was plenty of pathos because of the tragedy—but 
also to consider what was pathological.
For example, after a while I started to perceive increasingly that 
when he remembered with such intense vividness the memories 
of his wife’s illness and death, he was perhaps keeping it alive in 
memory, in the manner that Freud (1917e [1915]) suggested, and 
that this vividness could be a way of defending against the guilt 
he felt about his wife’s death. The question that came to me was: 
what kind of tears was he having when he cried so uncontrollably 
in the session?
I also remembered one of the ﬁrst things that D told me. He said, “I 
did not know anything then. . . . All I ever had is my hands”, which 
he showed me, builder’s hands, well worn by work. “If only I knew 
then what I know now.” And then he showed me his hands again 
and said, “These are all I’ve got.” Increasingly in the course of our 
sessions I came back to this communication and started to see it as 
a very condensed communication with different layers of meaning, 
a bit like a dream. On the one hand, it sounded like an apology, 
the protestation of innocence: “If only I knew this, it would not 
have happened, but I did not because I am an honest worker who 
doesn’t know much, and the proof is there in my hands. I am an 
honest worker with honest working hands. My hands are clean.” 
Now clearly this was both an admission of guilt and a protestation 
of hard-working innocence and ignorance.
Gradually he started to miss sessions or to came late, and I started 
to perceive a more negative aspect to the transference with me and 
a kind of subtle arrogance about the lateness when he failed to ring 
to tell me he couldn’t come, hardly excusing himself when I saw 
him again. He seemed to behave as if all this was par for the course, 
that there was no sense of loss, that it didn’t mean much to come 
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or not to come to a session, while on the other hand he remained 
plagued by despair, by suicidal, intrusive thoughts, and also by 
this dependence on antidepressants, which he was very unhappy 
with. I started to take up the way he mistreated his sessions, the 
way he made no allowance for any sense of loss in missing his 
session, or the way he seemed to be subtly contemptuous about 
his need for my help and about the help that I could give him. I in-
terpreted how he took refuge in his work instead, which provided 
him with very good excuses for not attending his sessions and not 
attending to his depression. I started to see a different meaning to 
his “all I’ve got are just my hands”. His hands, his zealous activity 
at work, his doing very well ﬁnancially—all of this was part and 
parcel of manic defence. It was also a way of denying that he had a 
mind and that things happened in his mind, a way, too, of denying 
the possibility of knowing what took place in his mind and the fact 
that he needed me to help him understand what had gone on in his 
mind leading to his depression.
D did much of the reconstructing by himself of what had hap-
pened. At times I would also help him to put things together about 
what had happened to his wife and what he felt in relation to her. 
Gradually he started to treat his sessions much more seriously, 
and after the tenth session he did not miss any of the subsequent 
sessions.
I shall now list what felt like some important landmarks in the 
progress D was making in his brief therapy once he had become 
more reconciled with his real needs as a patient. In his ninth ses-
sion he told me that he had decided to stop the antidepressant 
medication and was surprised at how easy it had been. I think 
he was able to cast off his unhealthy dependency on medication 
because he understood that a more healthy emotional process had 
begun in his therapy which allowed him to make better contact 
with his very unresolved grief. In other words he had begun to 
trust the value of his sessions.
Soon after, he made a very interesting self-observation: he said that 
he had thought about his wife at the weekend and had cried. But it 
was different this time, because after he had cried he felt relieved, 
whereas usually when he cried he felt depressed and little relief. 
This insightful self-observation, which conﬁrmed my sense that D 
had up to then suppressed his capacity to think and understand out 
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of his unconscious tormenting guilt, indicated that he was begin-
ning to understand by himself the important distinction between 
the pathos in his situation and the pathological in his depressed 
state. Depressed tears serve to evacuate mental pain and guilt but 
do not relieve the patient, whereas tears born out of sorrow follow 
the reinstatement of love for the lost object and bring relief to the 
mourner who can now let go of the lost loved one.
One month later he told me he had been able to take his new part-
ner over to Ireland on the anniversary of his wife’s death. This was 
the ﬁrst time he had been able to bring her directly on one of his 
trips to his wife’s grave and in this way bring his two partners to-
gether instead of hiding the one from the other out of guilt. Shortly 
afterwards he voiced for the ﬁrst time his concerns for his youngest 
son’s emotional state. I learnt that the latter had been experiencing 
difﬁculties at school and recently had been statemented. D wanted 
me to help refer him and his son and the whole family to a child 
guidance clinic. I saw this as an acknowledgement of the damage 
and mess he realized his manic denial had left behind and had 
caused to his son, who was not properly looked after in his early 
years. With the acknowledgement of his need for help there was a 
decrease of omnipotence along with an increase of more truly re-
parative urges and tendencies: he was feeling more able to face his 
guilt and put it right instead of ﬂeeing away from it like a haunted 
man. Finally, in the penultimate session he announced to me that 
he was planning to marry his partner, which he had avoided all 
this time because of his guilt.
Some psychodynamic features of this case
In conclusion, I shall outline some of the more salient psychodynamic 
features of D’s inability to mourn the loss of his wife and how this brief 
spell of analytic therapy allowed him to begin to face internally and 
externally his tragic loss. The effectiveness of this brief psychotherapy 
is in itself a testimony to the fact that D had no severe underlying 
personality problems which usually complicate both the experience of 
loss and can cause a more protracted and complex depressed state that 
is less accessible to psychotherapy.
D felt that unconsciously he had killed his wife. The loss of a loved 
one inevitably evokes the unconscious ambivalent feelings that the 
mourner has had towards his primal objects of infancy and childhood. 
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One’s guilt at the damage caused to these objects is revived by the 
more current loss. This brief psychotherapy precluded an understand-
ing of these more unconscious factors. However, what seemed clear 
was that D felt that his impulsive sexual desire and the unprotected 
sex had killed his wife. His sense of guilt was most probably exacer-
bated by his own Catholic morality and attitudes about sex. But the 
words of his wife had become absorbed by his internal tribunal, which 
proclaimed that indeed “he had killed her”.
It is possible to see how this internal tribunal was active in the 
way he heard both his wife’s wish and the recommendation made by 
the consultant who treated his wife. He heard both as edicts or strict 
injunctions that he felt he had to follow to the letter, in the manner of 
a sentence without parole passed by a tribunal.
Pitted against such a sense of guilt and inner torment, he tried to 
escape and protect himself by relying on a manic state of mind. He at-
tempted too quickly to replace his wife and to deny his own needs for 
her as a husband and a father of a baby boy.
He worked zealously, seeking a new beginning and acting as if he 
could be both father and mother at the same time. He cleansed his 
builder’s hands by making more money than he had before and in 
this way by looking after his family as if there had been no loss and 
limitations. But internally his sexual hands felt guilty and persecuting. 
I think D felt devastated but also angry with his wife for leaving him 
through her death. His anger and resentment exacerbated his already 
strong sense of guilt and his reliance on manic overactivity and omnip-
otent fantasies of self-sufﬁciency. Later he could acknowledge his guilt 
towards his daughter for his overreliance on her and indeed recognize 
that he had not done a very good job on parenting his young son. If 
mania protects against loss and depression, the omnipotent denial at 
the heart of mania creates more damage and guilt.
D’s sense of guilt emerged in the form of suicidal thoughts when 
he actually began to replace his wife with a new woman friend and 
partner. It was only then that his inability to mourn emerged with 
greater clarity. The suicidal thoughts were the internal sentence passed 
for his attempts to replace her too quickly, which itself was fuelled by 
unbearable guilt. His unhealthy dependence on antidepressants was 
also part of his manic ﬂight into self-sufﬁciency and an avoidance of 
his true psychic pain.
After two months of therapy, D began to give up his contemptu-
ous and devaluing attitude towards his treatment and towards his 
